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Abstract
In this paper we consider the linear-quadratic dieren-
tial game with an innite planning horizon. We derive
both necessary and sucient conditions for existence of
open-loop Nash equilibria for this game. Furthermore
we show how all equilibria can be easily obtained from
the eigenspace structure of a Hamiltonian matrix that is
associated with the game.
1 Introduction
The last decade there has been an increasing interest
to study several problems in economics using a dynamic
game theoretical setting. In particular in the area of en-
vironmental economics and macro-economic policy coor-
dination this is a very natural framework to model prob-
lems (see e.g. de Zeeuw et al. (1991), Maler (1992),
Kaitala et al. (1992) and Dockner et al. (1985), Tabellini
(1986), Fershtman et al. (1987), Petit (1989), Levine et
al. (1994), van Aarle et al. (1995), Douven et al (1995)).
In, e.g., policy coordination problems usually two basic
questions arise i.e., rst, are policies coordinated and, sec-
ond, which information do the participating parties have.
Usually both these points are rather unclear and, there-
fore, strategies for dierent possible scenarios are calcu-
lated and compared with eachother. One of these scenar-
ios is the so-called open-loop strategy. This scenario can
be interpreted as that the parties simultaneously deter-
mine their strategy, next submit their strategies to some
authority who then enforces these plans as binding com-
mitments. So, this strategy is based on the assumption
that the parties act non-cooperatively and that the only
information they have on the model is its present state
and the model structure. Obviously, since according this
scenario the participating parties can not react to ea-
chother's policies, its economic relevance is mostly rather
limited. However, as a benchmark to see how much par-
ties can gain by playing other strategies, it plays a fun-
damental role. Due to its analytic tractability the open-
loop Nash equilibrium strategy is in particular very pop-
ular for problems where the underlying model can be de-
scribed by a (set of) linear dierential equation(s) and the
individual objectives the parties are striving for can be
approximated by functions which quadratically penalize
deviations from some (equilibrium) targets. Under the
assumption that the parties only have a nite-planning
horizon, this problem was rst modeled and solved in a
mathematically rigorous way by Starr and Ho in (1969)
(see also Lukes et al (1971), Eisele (1982) and Engwerda
(1996) for extensions and more precise formulations).
In Abou-Kandil et al. (1993), Weeren (1995) and Eng-
werda (1996) also convergence of this equilibrium strat-
egy was studied if the planning horizon expands. Like
in the optimal linear quadratic regulator theory it turns
out that under some conditions it can be shown that this
strategy converges. Furthermore, this converged solution
is rather easy to calculate and much easier to implement
than the nite planning horizon equilibrium solution.
So, the question arises whether this (converged) solution
also solves the game if the parties consider an innite-
planning horizon. In Engwerda (1996) this problem was
partly solved. That is, on the one hand a sucient con-
dition was given under which open-loop Nash equilibria
exist and, on the other hand, for stable systems both a
necessary and sucient existence condition was derived.
In this paper we will extend this approach. We will show
that the condition derived in the above mentioned pa-
per is also necessary and sucient for the general case.
We will conclude this paper by a discussion on the con-
sequences of this result for numerical calculation of equi-
librium solutions and by considering some special cases
when (generically) a unique equilibrium exists.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section two we
start by stating the problem analysed in this paper and
present some preliminary properties. Section three con-
tains the basic result, whereas section four contains the
concluding remarks.
2 Preliminaries
In this paper we consider the problem where two parties
(henceforth called players) try to minimize their individ-
ual quadratic performance criterion. Each player controls
a dierent set of inputs to a single system, described by a
dierential equation of arbitrary order. As already men-
tioned in the introduction we assume that both players
have to formulate their strategy already at the moment
the system starts to evolve and this strategy can not be
changed once the system runs. So, the players have to
minimize their performance criterion based on the infor-
mation that they only know the dierential equation and
its initial state. We are looking now for combinations
of pairs of strategies of both players which are secure
against any attempt by one player to unilaterally alter
his strategy. That is, for those pairs of strategies which
are such that if one player deviates from his strategy he
will only lose. In the literature on dynamic games this
problem is well-known as the open-loop Nash non-zero-
sum linear quadratic dierential game (see e.g. Starr and
Ho (1969), Simaan and Cruz (1973), Basar and Olsder
(1982) or Abou-Kandil and Bertrand (1986)). Formally
the system we consider is as follows:
_x = Ax+ B1u1 + B2u2; x(0) = x0; (1)
where x is the n-dimensional state of the system, ui is an
mi-dimensional (control) vector player i can manipulate,
x0 is the initial state of the system, A;B1, and B2 are
constant matrices of appropriate dimensions, and _x de-
notes the time derivative of x.





















in which matrixRii is positive denite, Qi is semi-positive
denite and additionally is positive denite w.r.t. the
controllability subspace < A;Bi >; i = 1; 2.
Note that usually in literature each player's performance
criterium also includes a cross term, penalizing the con-
trol eorts of the other player. Since, however, this cross
term does not play a role in the analysis of open-loop
Nash equilibria, we dropped this term here (see any of
the references quoted above).
The set of admissible control functions we consider, is






; t 2 [0;1)j lim
tf!1
Ji(u1; u2) <1; i = 1; 2:g
Note that U depends on the initial state of the system
. For simplicity of notation we omit, however, this de-
pendency. Furthermore, it is clear that ui(:) 2 L
2 , the
set of square integrable functions, but that U is not a
linear subspace of L2 . First, since the zero-function will
in general not belong to U and, second, in general with
v; w 2 U , v + w 62 U . However, U does satisfy the fol-
lowing important property:
Lemma 1:
Assume that both v and v+w are an element of U . Then
for any real  also v + w 2 U :
Proof:
First we introduce some notation.
Let xu denote the state trajectory obtained by us-
ing the control function u, that is, xu(t) := e
Atx0 +R t
0
eA(t )(B1 B2)u( )d .
Since by assumption both v and v + w belong to U ,
xv(t) and xv+w(t) converge to zero if t ! 1. So,
xv(t)   xv+w(t) =
R t
0
eA(t )(B1 B2)w( )d ! 0, if
t ! 1. Moreover, since both xv and xv+w are square
integrable, also the righthandside of the above equation
is square integrable. Now, consider xv+w(t). Elemen-




eA(t )(B1 B2)w( )d . So, using the above result,
it is clear that xv+w(t) is square integrable. Moreover,
since both v and v + w are square integrable it follows
that w has to be square integrable too. From this follows
then immediately that also v + w is square integrable.
Combining both results gives then that limtf!1 Ji(v +
w) <1; i = 1; 2: Which implies that v + w 2 U . 2
Next, we introduce the set of coupled algebraic asymmet-
ric Riccati-type equations associated with this problem:
0 =  ATK1  K1A  Q1 +K1S1K1 +K1S2K2; (2)
0 =  ATK2  K2A  Q2 +K2S2K2 +K2S1K1; (3)




i ; i = 1; 2:
We will see in the next section that the solutions K1;K2
to this set of equations, that satisfy an additional stability
property, play a similar role like the stabilizing solution
of the algebraic Riccati equation in the standard LQ reg-
ulator problem.
3 The equilibrium strategies
The basic result of this paper is summarized in the next
theorem:
Theorem 2:
The two-player linear quadratic dierential game (1) has




if and only if there exist K1 and K2 that are
solutions of the algebraic Riccati equations (ARE) sat-
isfying the additional constraint that the eigenvalues of
Acl := A  S1K1   S2K2 are all situated in the left half
complex plane.





i Kix(t); i = 1; 2
is an open-loop Nash equilibrium strategy.
Moreover, the costs obtained by using this strategy for






Acltx0dt; i = 1; 2:
2
Proof:
" ( " This part was proved by Engwerda (1996), theo-
rem 12.
") " To prove this part we use the variational approach
(see e.g. Friedman (1971), Lukes and Russell (1971) and
Engwerda (1996)).
Suppose that u1; u2 are a Nash solution. That is,
J1(u1; u2)  J1(u1; u2) and J2(u1; u2)  J2(u1; u2): (4)









2 U we have, according lemma 1, that for
any real number 
J1() := J1(u1 + w; u2)  J1(u1; u2): (5)
Let xu(t) and xu+w(t) be the solutions to (1) correspond-











tively. Then it is easily veried that (see also proof of
lemma 1)




eA(t s)B1w(s)ds is a square integrable
function.











Note that f(t; ) is dierentiable w.r.t.  for every t 2
(0;1). Simple calculations show that
@f
@
= 2(gT (t)Q1g(t) + w
T (t)R11w(t))+
2(gT (t)Q1xu(t) + w
T (t)R11u1(t))
Using the facts that g(t); w(t) and u1(t) are square inte-
grable, it is obvious now that @f
@
is integrable for, e.g.,
all  2 [ 1; 1]. Using standard arguments we have then






f(gT (t)Q1g(t) + w
T (t)R11w(t))+
(gT (t)Q1xu(t) + w
T (t)R11u1(t))gdt
From (5) we get
dJ1()
d





fgT (t)Q1xu(t) + w
T (t)R11u1(t)gdt = 0:
Substitution of the expression for g(t) into this equation











wT (t)R11u1(t)dt = 0:










wT (t)R11u1(t)dt = 0:
Now, choose in the above expression con-








 tei, i=1,..,n, where  is an arbitrary real
number larger than the spectral radius of matrix A and
ei is the i-th standard basis vector in IR
n. Then it is
clear that for every choice of w(t), u1 + w(t) 2 U . Con-



































T (s t)Q2xu(s)ds. Then u1 =
 R 111 B
T




2 v3(t). Moreover, it is








A v(t); with v1(0) = x0:
(10)
Since by assumption for arbitrary x0, v(t) converges to
zero, it follows that there exist K1; K2 and a stable
matrix  such that  
0














A: Writing out these equations yields then the
advertised result. 2
Remarks:
Parts of the above proof can be substituted by using the
results of Haurie et al. (1984, lemma 5.1). This requires,
however, the introduction of the concept of weak over-
taking optimality. In this framework it is not required
that the state or the performance criterium converge (see
Halkin (1974)). Since we like to stay in the framework of
bounded performance criteria, we choose to give an ele-
mentary selfcontained proof of the theorem.
Note that in case the system is not stabilizable, the prob-
lem has no solution.
In the above theorem the costs for the individual players
are expressed as an integral. In fact, analogously to the
optimal LQ regulator theory, we have that the costs can
be obtained indirectly by solving the following associated
Lyapunov equations1
ATclMi +MiAcl + Qi +K
T
i SiKi = 0; (11)
where Acl := A  S1K1   S2K2, i=1,2.
Note that if all eigenvalues of Acl are in the left half com-
plex plane and Qi + K
T
i SiKi  0, this equation has a
unique positive semi-denite solution Mi. The equilib-
rium costs can then also be obtained as
Proposition 3:
Assume that K1;K2 solve (ARE) and satisfy the stabi-
lization property mentioned in theorem 2. Let Mi be the
unique positive semi-denite solution of the above Lya-
punov equation (11): Then,
Ji(u1; u2) = x
T
0Mix0; i = 1; 2: (12)
Proof:
Let Mi  0 be the unique solution of (11). Then, using

I like to thank Arie Weeren for pointing out this to me






















which proves the claim. 2
4 The solutions for the algebraic
Riccati equation
In the previous section we saw that we can nd all equi-
librium solutions by determining all solutions K1;K2 of
the set of algebraic Riccati equations (ARE), which sat-
isfy the additional property that all eigenvalues of the
corresponding matrix A   S1K1   S2K2 lie in the left
half complex plane.
MacFarlane (1963) and Potter (1966) independently dis-
covered that there exists a relationship between the stabi-
lizing solution of the algebraic Riccati equation and the
eigenvectors of a related Hamiltonian matrix in linear
quadratic regulator problems. Abou-Kandil et al. (1993)
already pointed out the existence of a similar relation-
ship for our problem. One of their results was that if the
planning horizon tf in (1) tends to innity, under some
technical conditions, the solution of the nite planning
horizon problem converges to a solution which requires
the calculation of a solution K1;K2 of (ARE) which can
be calculated from the eigenspaces of the matrix
M :=
0





In Engwerda et al. (1995) this relationship between so-
lutions of (ARE) and eigenspaces of matrix M was elab-
orated. Using the notation Minv for the set of all M -
invariant subspaces, it was shown that all solutions for
the set of algebraic Riccati equations can be calculated
from the following subset of M -invariant subspaces:
Kpos :=

K 2MinvjK  Im
0






Note that elements in this set Kpos can be calculated us-
ing the set of matrices
Kpos :=

K 2 IR3nnjImK Im
0






The following result was proved:
Proposition 4:
(ARE) has a real solution (K1;K2) if and only if K1 =
Y X 1 and K2 = ZX












i Ki(t)x0 are used to
control the system (1), the spectrum of the closed-loop
matrix A  S1K1   S2K2 coincides with ( M jK). 2
From this result we rst of all observe that every element
of Kpos denes exactly one solution of (ARE). Further-
more, this set contains only a nite number of elements if
and only if the geometric multiplicities of all eigenvalues
ofM is one (see e.g. Lancaster and Tismenetsky (1985)).
So, in that case we immediately conclude that (ARE) will
have at most a nite number of solutions. Furthermore,
we see that
Corollary 5:
(ARE) will have a set of solutions (K1;K2) stabilizing
the closed-loop system matrix A   S1K1   S2K2 if and
only if there exists an M invariant subspace K in Kpos
such that Re  > 0 for all  2 (M jK). 2
So, the study of the equilibria of our LQ game boils down
to the study of all M invariant subspaces K in Kpos for
which Re  > 0 for all  2 (M jK).
The next example illustrates that in general there may
be more than one equilibrium:
Example 6:





0  1 0  1
0 1  1 0
0 0 1  1
 2 0 0 1
1
CCA ; B1 = I4, Q1 =
diag(3.5,2,4,5), Q2 = diag(1.5,6,3,1), R11 = I4, and
R22 = 2I4.
By considering the eigenvalues and corresponding
eigenspaces of matrix M , it was shown that (ARE) has
7 solutions K1;K2 satisfying the stabilization property.
So, according to theorem 2, for this choice of matrices,
the innite planning horizon game has 7 open-loop Nash
equilibria. 2
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we considered the existence of open-loop
Nash equilibrium solutions in the two-player innite-
planning horizon linear quadratic game. We derived both
necessary and sucient conditions for existence of such
equilibria. Furthermore we showed how these equilib-
ria can be calculated from the invariant subspaces of
the Hamiltonian matrix associated with this game M =0




A. It turns out that the eigenvalues of
the closed-loop system, if the open-loop control strategies
are implemented in (1), can be obtained from the eigen-
values of this matrix.
As was illustrated in an example, in general the game
will have more than one equilibrium. An important open
problem remains the study of the eigenstructure of this
matrix M .
One property, which was already noted in Engwerda
(1996), is that if a discounting factor is included in the
performance function that is large enough, matrixM will
have n stable eigenvalues. So, in that case there exists at
most one equilibrium. Since generically the correspond-
ing eigenvectors will be such that they together form an
element of Kpos, we get generically a unique equilibrium
in the discounted case. Moreover, combining the results
on scalar systems from Engwerda (1996) and the results
of theorem 2, we have that for scalar systems there exists
always a unique equilibrium.
Finally we note that the obtained results can be straight-
forwardly generalized to the N player game.
Given the results presented here, one might wonder
whether we can exploit some of them to get results for the
linear quadratic feedback Nash game. At a rst glance
this seems, however, not the case. This, since the cor-
responding Hamiltonian matrix M depends on the so-
lutions of the corresponding algebraic Riccati equations
(see e.g. Weeren (1995)). In Weeren et al. (1994) a suf-
cient condition can be found for existence of a feedback
Nash equilibrium in linear stationary strategies for this
dierential game over an innite planning horizon. More-
over, this paper contains a thorough dynamical analysis
for the scalar case. For more references and results on
this subject we refer to Basar and Olsder (1995), Weeren
(1995) and the quoted references in both these references.
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